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Part I: Introduction
Though free speech is a pillar of American society, it is appropriate at times, to qualify or
even restrict speech. This Note argues in favor of one such restriction on attorney advertising and
critiques the Third Circuit’s reasons for striking down the restriction. In Dwyer v. Cappell,1 the
Third Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of “Guideline 3,” a Rule of Professional Conduct.2
Guideline 3, adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2012, stated that attorneys could not
include subsections of a court opinion “about the attorney’s abilities or legal services” in any
advertising. 3 Ultimately, the Court held that Guideline 3 violated the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech.4 In particular, it held that Guideline 3 failed to meet the low threshold
established in Zauderer v. Officer of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 5 which
pertains to “disclosure requirements” on commercial speech.6 Because of this, the Court failed to
explore the heightened standard articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service
Comm’n of N.Y.,7 which pertains to “restrictions” or bans on commercial speech.8
The Court held that Guideline 3 failed to meet the threshold for disclosure requirements
because it practically banned commercial speech by demanding “unduly burdensome”
requirements. 9 To support that reasoning, the Third Circuit looked to cases where disclosure

1

Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 284-85.
3
Rules of Professional Conduct, Guideline 3 (effective June 1, 2012),
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/apprpc.htm.
4
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276.
5
Id. at 284.
6
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
7
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
8
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-5; Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284.
9
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284.
2

2

requirements were unduly burdensome and posited that Guideline 3 was equally burdensome.10
This Note posits that the Third Circuit incorrectly held that Guideline 3 was unconstitutional.
Part II of this Note will provide background information regarding the origin and evolution
of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct.11 It will also give the procedural history and
facts of the case at issue.12 Part III begins by discussing relevant legal background surrounding
the Third Circuit's holding and this Note's response, discussing the standards the Supreme Court
established for analyzing issues involving free speech and commercial speech.13 Then, this Note
explains how and why the Third Circuit incorrectly applied the legal standards.14 Part IV
explores the impact of the Third Circuit's ruling on attorney advertising, free speech, and public
trust in the legal system moving forward.15 Lastly, Part V concludes by reasserting this Note’s
legal arguments and the effect of the Third Circuit’s ruling.16
This Note will not, however, discuss Guideline 3’s effect on other forms of advertising,
such as billboard or television ads, nor whether Guideline would be able to meet the Central
Hudson standard for commercial speech restrictions. It only suggests that if Dwyer were
appealed to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit’s decision should be reversed; moreover,
Guideline 3 should be viewed as an appropriate disclosure requirement in light of Zauderer, and
perhaps a necessary form of speech restriction in the legal community.
Part II: Background
A. New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct

10

Id. at 283-84.
See infra Part II A.
12
See infra Part II B.
13
See infra Part III A, B, and C.
14
See infra Part III D, E, and F.
15
See infra Part IV.
16
See infra Part V.
11
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This Note deals with a Third Circuit case involving a specific provision within the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). Though New Jersey only recently established its
own rules governing attorneys, rules of this sort date back farther than one hundred years within
the general legal community. 17 In 1908, the ABA effectuated the “Canons of Professional
Ethics,” which New Jersey later adopted as its own professional regulation framework. 18 In
1971, New Jersey adopted the “Disciplinary Rules of the ABA’s Code of Professional
Responsibility,” which the ABA created to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics.19 In fact,
New Jersey did not establish its own independent code of professional conduct until 1984, as it
had previously chosen to adopt whatever the ABA standard at the time.20 In 1984, however, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, guided by Chief Justice Wilentz, appointed the “Debevoise
Committee” to study the ABA’s “Model Rules of Professional Conduct” and make any
necessary revisions.21
The Supreme Court’s power to create the committee originated from the New Jersey
Constitution itself.22 The New Jersey Constitution gives the New Jersey Supreme Court the right
to “make rules governing the administration of all the courts in the State, and subject to the law,
the practice and procedure in all such courts.”23 The Supreme Court has long understood this
provision as a grant of authority to “exercise exclusive power over the disciplining of

17

2 New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NEW JERSEY 318
(2000).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Redefining of Professional Ethics in New Jersey under Chief
Justice Robert Wilentz: A Legacy of Reform, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 351, 362 (1997).
21
Id.
22
N.J. CONST. art VI, §2, ¶3.
23
Id.
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attorneys.” 24 Part of this power encompasses the ability to establish a code of professional
conduct that guides how attorneys in New Jersey are to carry out their professional endeavors.25
The Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct has made sporadic amendments to
the New Jersey RPC over the past thirty years. Two larger scale reforms came in 1995, via the
“Michels Commission,”26 and in 2003, via the “Pollock Commission.”27 Even so, the Rules of
Professional Conduct established by the Debevoise Committee remain largely intact today.
B. Summary of Dwyer
One of these provisions, a rule restricting attorney advertising, was as the focus of the
court’s attention in Dwyer v. Cappell.28 There, the Third Circuit heard an appeal regarding the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Cappell, who represented the New Jersey
Committee on Attorney Advertising.29 Andrew Dwyer was a New Jersey attorney who displayed
several quotes of unpublished judicial opinions, including apparent endorsements of his skills as
an attorney and advocate, on a website advertising his legal services.30 These “endorsements”
came in the context of cases concerning the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, which
contains fee-shifting provisions mandating that the judges “assess the abilities and legal services
of plaintiffs’ attorneys” in deciding the cases.31

24

In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 678 (1984).
Id. (“[O]ur constitutional responsibility is so clear as to leave no doubt of our duty to adopt a rule that we think is
needed...”).
26
Report of the New Jersey Ethics Commission ("Michels Comm'n Report"), 133 N.J.L.J. 905 (March 15, 1993).
27
Administrative Determinations in response to the Report and Recommendation of the Supreme Court Commission
on the Rules of Professional Conduct, (September 10, 2003),
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/admin-deter-rpcs.pdf.
28
Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2014).
29
At the time of trial, Cynthia Cappell served as Chair of the Supreme Court of New Jersey Committee on Attorney
Advertising.
30
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276.
31
N.J. STAT. § 10:5-27.1 (2002); Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276.
25
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In 2008, Judge Wertheimer, one of the judges Dwyer had quoted on his website, sent a
letter to Dwyer asking him to remove the quote. 32 Knowing the true context in which the
statements were made, Wertheimer feared that, though the quotes were technically accurate,
Dwyer’s potential clients would believe Wertheimer had given Dwyer a “blanket
endorsement.”33 When Dwyer refused, arguing that the quote was neither false nor misleading,
Judge Wertheimer contacted the New Jersey Bar’s Committee on Attorney Advertising. 34
The Committee eventually submitted a guideline, Guideline 3, that stated “an attorney or
law firm may not include, on a website or other advertisement, a quotation from a judge or court
opinion . . . regarding the attorney’s abilities or legal services.” 35 Dwyer maintained that
Guideline 3 unconstitutionally restricted his free speech, going so far as to post an additional
quote on his website, after the Committee’s decision.36
In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved the Guideline 3. 37 At its core,
Guideline 3 banned attorneys from using excerpts of court opinions in their advertisements, but
allowed them to “present the full text of opinions, including those that discuss the attorney’s
legal abilities.”38 Before Guideline 3 went into effect, however, Dwyer filed a motion to keep it
from being enforced.39
During trial, Carol Johnston, an agent for the Committee on Attorney Advertising,
testified that, “even if the quotations include hyperlinks to the full text of the judicial opinions,
they would still violate the Guideline.”40 She also admitted that the Committee had no evidence

32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 277.
37
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 277.
38
Guideline 3, supra note 3.
39
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 278.
40
Id.
33
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of complaints from anyone other than Judge Wertheimer, but that they used “common sense” to
conclude that clients could be misled by the excerpts.41
The Court decided the legal issue revolved around “whether Guideline 3 is most
appropriately characterized as a ‘restriction’ on speech, or whether it instead is a regulatory
requirement of ‘additional disclosure.’” 42 If characterized as a restriction, Guideline 3 would
have to satisfy much more stringent qualifications to be constitutional than if it were simply a
disclosure requirement. Positing that the guideline only amounted to a disclosure requirement,
however, the District Court upheld the Guideline as constitutional.43 Dwyer then appealed to the
Third Circuit.44
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Guideline 3 failed to meet the Supreme Court’s
Zauderer standard for disclosure requirements.45 The Court focused heavily on the requirement
that disclosure statements not be “unduly burdensome.”46 In positing that Guideline 3 is unduly
burdensome, the Third Circuit interpreted two cases, Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg.,
Bd. of Accountancy47 and Public Citizen Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd..48
In Ibanez, the “detail required in the disclaimer . . . effectively rule[d] out” the specific
ways the plaintiff attempted to advertise, which were by “business card, letterhead, and in a
yellow pages listing.”49 In Public Citizen, the court required attorneys employing televised or
electronic advertisements to include numerous pieces of information both audibly and in

41

Id.
Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673 (D.N.J. 2013), rev’d, 762 F.3d (3d Cir. 2014).
43
Id. at 675.
44
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 275.
45
Id. at 287.
46
Id.
47
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
48
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y. Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).
49
Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146-48.
42
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writing.50 The Fifth Circuit held that this requirement made the attorneys “unable to effectively
use short . . . television or radio advertisements.”51
Relying on those cases, the Third Circuit held that Guideline 3 “effectively precludes
advertising” by requiring the full text of opinions instead of excerpts. 52 The Court did not
analyze Guideline 3 under the Cent. Hudson standard for restrictions because “the Guideline is
not reasonably related to preventing consumer deception . . . Hence, it is unconstitutional under
the even less-stringent Zauderer standard of scrutiny.” 53 The Zauderer standard requires that
disclosure requirements be reasonably related to the goal of preventing consumer deception.54
Part III: Analysis
Though the Third Circuit determined that Guideline 3 impermissibly restricted Dwyer’s
First Amendment rights, the Court inappropriately applied a stricter standard than Supreme
Court has required and misused prior case law to rule in Dwyer’s favor. Using, among other
things, the very cases the Third Circuit used to reach its contrary decision, this Note will argue
that the Court should have taken the claims that Dwyer’s advertisement was inherently
misleading more seriously, because inherently misleading advertisements do not receive
constitutional protection.55 Furthermore, the note will argue that, in the alternative, Dwyer’s note
is potentially misleading and therefore open to disclosure requirements.56
A. Standard of Review

50

Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 228.
Id.
52
Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2014).
53
Id.
54
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
55
See infra Part III E.
56
See infra Part III F.
51
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When a Court analyzes any First Amendment claim, the first step is to determine the type
of speech that may be subjected to potential restrictions or disclosure.57 This is because certain
speech receives “less extensive” levels of protection than others.58
Both parties in Dwyer agreed that the speech at issue was commercial in nature. 59
Commercial speech is speech that serves the financial interest of the speaker and “assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information.”60 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized a “commonsense distinction”
between speech that relates to commercial transactions and other varieties of speech. 61 The
parties’ agreement, that the speech at issue was commercial, helps focus the legal argument,
because once the type of speech is ascertained, the only remaining issue was what permissible
restrictions or prohibitions could be placed on that speech.62 While the committee “maintain[ed]
that Guideline 3 [was] a disclosure requirement,” Dwyer contended that it was an impermissible
restriction.63
B. Restrictions and Central Hudson
In 1980, the Supreme Court articulated the more repressive of the two types of
constraints, which completely restricts commercial speech.64 In Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court tackled a regulation that restricted the advertising ability of a gas and electric company.65
In 1973, the Public Service Commission of New York banned all electric utilities from
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 309 (1st Cir. 2005) (“the initial question we must confront is
the nature of the speech”).
58
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression”).
59
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 280 (“The parties agree that our case involves only commercial speech”).
60
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
61
Id. at 562.
62
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 280 (“[T]his case concerns two possible tracks of analysis, only one of which can apply:
restrictions on speech and disclosure requirements”).
63
Id.
64
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
65
Id.
57
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producing any advertising that promoted the use of electricity, while permitting “informational”
advertising that encouraged “shifts in consumption” as opposed to increases in consumption.66
The Commission argued that such advertising would be misleading, “by appearing to encourage
energy consumption at a time when conservationa [was] needed.” 67 Central Hudson sued,
claiming the ban was a violation of its First Amendment right to free speech.68 The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the ban, positing, “the governmental interest in the prohibition
outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue.”69
The Supreme Court reversed, and established the test still used today for determining
whether a restriction on commercial speech is constitutional.70 To analyze the constitutionality of
a restriction on commercial speech, a court must first ask whether the speech itself is protected.71
If the speech advertises illegal activity, or if it is misleading, the government may have the
ability to ban it outright.72 If the advertisement is not misleading or endorsing illegal activity, the
court must inquire whether the State has asserted a substantial interest that the restriction aims to
further, and whether the restriction “directly advances” the State’s interest. 73 Lastly, the
restriction is not constitutional if the State’s interest “could be served as well by a more limited
restriction.”74 The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted this same framework.75

66

Id. at 558-60.
Id.
68
Id. at 559.
69
Id. at 561.
70
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-66.
71
Id. at 563.
72
Id. at 563-64.
73
Id. at 564.
74
Id. at 564.
75
In re Op. 39 of Comm. on Att’y Adver., 197 N.J. 66, 69-71, 79 (2008) (using a four-part Central Hudson test to
determine that a ban on the use of the phrase “Super Lawyer” in advertising was unconstitutional).
67

10

It must be noted that the Supreme Court has clearly established a difference between
“inherently” misleading advertisements and “potentially” misleading advertisements.

76

Inherently misleading advertisements are subject to restrictions whereas potentially misleading
advertisements are not.

77

When an advertisement is potentially misleading, disclosure

requirements may be enforced to prevent its audience from being misled.78
C. Disclosure Requirements and Zauderer
In an effort to clarify the constraints the State could place on commercial speech, the
Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1985.79 In Zauderer, the Supreme Court decided “whether a
State may seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring attorneys to disclose in
their advertisements certain information regarding fee arrangements.”80
There, attorney Philip Zauderer ran several successful newspaper advertisements. 81
Though the “Office of Disciplinary Counsel” believed that all Zauderer’s advertisements
violated provisions of Ohio’s Disciplinary Rules82, the Supreme Court only considered one of the
advertisements.83 In it, Zauderer marketed to women who had used a particular I.U.D., noting,
“[t]he cases are handled on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.”84 The Office argued that this advertisement
violated a provision under the Disciplinary Rules that required advertisements for contingent-fee
rates to disclose “whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and
expenses,” and that it would deceive potential customers by suggesting they might not be
76

In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); See infra Parts III E and F for a more detailed discussion on
“potentially” and “inherently” misleading advertising.
77
In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203.
78
Id.
79
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985).
80
Id. at 629.
81
Id. at 629-31.
82
Id. at 631-33.
83
Id. at 636.
84
Id. at 630-631.
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required to pay anything at all if their claim was unsuccessful.85 Zauderer’s responded by stating
that the Disciplinary Rules were unconstitutional as applied to him because they violated his
First Amendment free speech right.86
The Supreme Court held that “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception,” because
disclosure requirements are less burdensome on the party washing to advertise than restrictions.87
Furthermore, the Court held that disclosure requirements are constitutional as long as they “are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”88 and are not
“unduly burdensome.”89 The Court rejected Zauderer’s First Amendment defense.90
In doing so, the Supreme Court created a second way for the State to restrict a party’s
commercial speech, which commands less scrutiny from the Court than it would under Central
Hudson. Because disclosure requirements need only be reasonably related to preventing
deception, the burden of persuasion for a disclosure requirement is substantially lower than when
the State, wishing to restrict commercial speech, is required to establish that the restriction is
supported by a “substantial” State interest and is narrowly tailored to achieving that interest.91
D. Guideline 3 and Commercial Speech
Though the Third Circuit believed Guideline 3 overly burdened Dwyer’s right to
advertise, it erred in reversing the District Court’s holding that Guideline 3 permissibly
constrained free speech under Zauderer. 92 Below, this Note puts forth two arguments

85

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632-634.
Id. at 634.
87
Id. at 651.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 655.
91
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
92
Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675-76 (D.N.J. 2013), rev’d, 762 F.3d (3d Cir. 2014).
86
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demonstrating why Guideline 3 is a permissible constraint on commercial speech. 93 First,
Dwyer’s advertising on his website was deemed, in the estimation of the source it cited, to be
inherently misleading. As such, it is not deserving of First Amendment Protection.94 Secondly,
even if Dwyer’s advertisement was not inherently misleading, it is potentially misleading and
therefore the State may enforce disclosure requirements.95 Guideline 3 amounts to a disclosure
requirement, which is not unduly burdensome, as opposed to an effective ban as the Third
Circuit claims.96
E. Dwyer’s Advertising Was Deemed Inherently Misleading
The Supreme Court in Central Hudson posited, “there can be no constitutional objection
to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity.” 97 It reasoned that government’s power is only circumscribed when the commercial
speech is not misleading.98 Two years later, the Court further developed this framework in In re
R. M. J.,99 holding that while the State could not impose absolute restrictions on information that
is only potentially misleading, it was within its constitutional authority to prohibit inherently
misleading advertising entirely. 100 Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly defined
“inherently misleading,” it hinted in Friedman v. Rogers101 that an issue arises when “there is a

93

See supra Part III A and B.
In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
95
Id.
96
Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2014).
97
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
98
Id. at 564.
99
In re R. M. J., 455 U.S at 191.
100
Id. at 203.
101
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
94
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significant possibility” the public will be misled.102 The Third Circuit has also used this
“inherently misleading” framework as recently as a few months before Dwyer.103
Therefore, it is disconcerting that the Court did not inquire into whether Dwyer’s
advertising was misleading at all, but rather proceeded immediately to their belief that Guideline
3 is “not reasonably related” to the State’s interest.104 This was not the appropriate analysis, as
explained in Zauderer, where the Supreme Court determined that when “the possibility of
deception is as it is in this case,” the State bears no other burden to support its disclosure
requirement.105
While the Court admits that the Committee considers Guideline 3 to be “inherently
misleading,” it also noted that Guideline 3 is “not reasonably related to preventing consumer
deception.”106 But, it was a mistake for the Court to fail to go beyond a cursory discussion of
whether Dwyer’s advertisement was inherently misleading.107 The entire analysis would have
shifted if the Court had first determined that Dwyer’s advertising was, in fact, inherently
misleading and therefore not entitled to any constitutional protection from restrictions.108 For the
Court to ignore such a significant portion of commercial speech analysis is surprising and might
be the reason the erred in its reasoning.
Dwyer’s advertising was deemed to be inherently misleading because, as in Zauderer, the
average reasonable public citizen would not understand the proper context of Judge
See also In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 202 (where the Court understood it to mean “inherently likely to deceive”).
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 89-90 (3rd Cir. 2014) (where the Third Circuit explained that, since Central
Hudson, the Supreme Court has distinguished inherently or actually misleading commercial speech from only
potentially misleading commercial speech) (citing Wine & Spirits Retailers v. R.I., 481 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007)).
104
Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 280-82 (3d Cir. 2014).
105
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985) (upholding a disclosure
requirement regarding an advertisement that claimed no legal fees would be required but upon a successful lawsuit
because it was held to mislead clients into believing that no fees, whatsoever, would be required).
106
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 282.
107
Id.
108
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); See also In re R.
M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
102
103
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Wertheimer’s quote and might make an impermissible inference about its content. That is
precisely the interpretation made by the advertisement’s source itself. Wertheimer was primarily
concerned with clients believing his quote was “a blanket endorsement” of Dwyer’s skills as an
attorney, though this was clearly not the case.109 Like the others on Dwyer’s website,
Wertheimer’s quote came in the context of determining a fee-shifting application, where the
judge is required to make a judgment about the attorney’s performance.110 This quote, therefore,
was an obligatory part of Judge Wertheimer’s decision and not given freely as an
endorsement.111
As Cappell argued, Dwyer’s advertising, however, could lead a potential customer to
believe Judge Wertheimer was endorsing Dwyer as an attorney. Here, as in Zauderer, the State
argued that the deceit was “self-evident” and therefore required no external proof of consumer
deception.112 No part of Dwyer’s website clarified that the quotations were made in a highly
specific context, which did not pertain to Dwyer’s skills as an attorney in general. 113
Additionally, Dwyer did not retain any mention of fee-shifting in the quotes, depriving the
statements of the necessary context to appreciate their appropriate meaning. 114 This is
comparable to the deception in Zauderer, where an attorney advertised, “[i]f there is no recovery,
no legal fees are owed by our clients.”115 There, the advertisement was misleading because “to a
layman . . . the advertisement would suggest that employing appellant would be a no-lose
proposition,” when in fact a client might still be required to pay other costs associated with

109

Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 277.
Id. at 277-78.
111
Id.
112
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985).
113
Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276-77.
114
Id. at 277.
115
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631.
110
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trials.116 Dwyer’s advertising is just as confusing to a layperson who might believe these judges
are personally endorsing Dwyer above other attorneys. That type of behavior by a judge would
most likely violate the New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct. 117 Because laypersons are
unfamiliar with rules against impropriety, common sense indicates that a client would believe
such impropriety were taking place and that the judges were speaking about Dwyer’s talents in
general.
Therefore, because Judge Wertheimer could have reasonably believed Dwyer’s
advertisements were inherently misleading, and inherently misleading advertisements are not
deserving of First Amendment protection, the Court erred in disregarding the analysis. If
Dwyer’s advertising is inherently misleading, Guideline 3 is permissible.118
F. Dwyer’s Advertising Was Potentially Misleading And Therefore Constitutionally
Subject To A Disclosure Requirement
If Dwyer’s advertisements were not inherently misleading, they were at least potentially
misleading for the same reasons. 119 The Supreme Courts of both New Jersey and the United
States have explicitly stated that attorney advertising can still be subject to certain restrictions or
requirements, even when blanket bans are inappropriate.120 In Zauderer, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that disclosure requirements must be reasonably related to the
governmental interest and must not be overly burdensome.121 In essence, a requirement is unduly

116

Id. at 652, 634-35.
N.J. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1, 2(A) (2014) (stating that a judge should “personally observe” “high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved” and act in ways that
promote “public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”).
118
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
119
See supra Part III E.
120
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be
subjected to blanket suppression... we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in
any way.”); See also In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 104 N.J. 515, 517 (1986).
121
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
117
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burdensome when it is a practical ban on speech, rather than an actual ban.122 Here, Guideline 3
furthers the dual legitimate governmental interests of preventing deception of potential clients
and also “preserving public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.”123 Additionally, it is
not overly burdensome as applied to Dwyer because the nature of websites generally permit a
“theoretically endless capacity” to advertise.124
A look at how the First Circuit has approached Zauderer proves to be informative in
determining appropriate disclosure requirements. In Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, the First
Circuit dealt with a Vermont statute that required products containing mercury to have their
packaging “inform consumers that the products contain mercury” and proper recycling
procedure.125 The Court upheld the statute, reversing the District Court’s determination that the
statute was “insufficiently precise in producing the desired ends.”126 Responding to this specific
objection to the statute, the First Circuit said, “[t]he prescribed labeling would likely contribute
directly to the reduction of mercury pollution, whether or not it makes the greatest possible
contribution.”127 The First Circuit understood that the test established under Zauderer was meant
to require a

“less exacting scrutiny” than the Central Hudson test. 128 It is not, therefore,

necessary for a disclosure requirement to satisfy the requirement from Central Hudson that there
be no less restrictive way to serve the government’s interest.129
In the New Jersey statute, like the statute in Nat’l Elec., there are other requirements
besides Guideline 3 that may potentially better serve the state’s interests in preventing consumer
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deception and preserving the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. In fact, the
Third Circuit gives insightful suggestions for less burdensome requirements on attorney
advertising that would still serve the State’s interests.130 Though those requirements may more
effectively further the State’s interests, the Zauderer test does not require such narrow tailoring
of disclosure requirements; all it requires is that the State’s interest is “reasonably related” to the
disclosure requirement.131 Here, Guideline 3’s requirement to post the entire holding reasonably
allows consumers to determine that these judicial quotes were made in the context of a much
larger litigation. This will dispel the idea that these quotes were the focal point of the hearing, or
that they were unprovoked compliments. In fact, it would be difficult for the Third Circuit to
support its conclusion that context, in any situation, does not reasonably give better clarity to an
excerpt. This is, in fact, the exact argument the District Court put forth when it ruled in favor of
Cappell in upholding the constitutionality of Guideline 3. Specifically, the court said, “A judicial
quotation’s potential to mislead a consumer is self-evidence. Without the surrounding context of
a full opinion, judicial quotations relating to an attorney’s abilities could easily be misconstrued
as improper judicial endorsement of an attorney.”132 Therefore the Third Circuit wrongly applied
the Central Hudson standard of scrutiny when determining whether Guideline 3 was reasonably
related to the State’s interest.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit incorrectly held that Guideline 3 is “unduly
burdensome.” 133 To substantiate its claim, the Court focused on two other cases wherein
disclosure requirements were held to be unduly burdensome, Ibanez and Public Citizen Inc. v.
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La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.. 134 Those cases, however, bear little resemblance to Dwyer’s
situation. 135 Whereas the disclosure requirements in those cases effectively banned the
commercial speech altogether, Guideline 3, at least when applied to websites, does not go that
far. Because of a website’s vast storage capacity, Dwyer is not inhibited from advertising online
like the attorneys in Ibanez and Public Citizen. The Third Circuit recognized this when it said,
“[t]he only realistic medium for quoting a full judicial opinion in an advertisement is, ironically,
a website, with its theoretically endless capacity.” 136 Websites are a “realistic medium” for
Guideline 3, because their vast storage allow for virtually unlimited amounts of content. Though
the Third Circuit found this fact “ironic,” it ought to have considered it more closely; an
understanding that Guideline 3 is not unduly burdensome as applied to websites would have
altered the outcome of the case.
Although the Court attempted to look beyond Dwyer’s particular case and claimed that
“Guideline 3 is all the more stark when applied to attorney advertising in a newspaper or
magazine, let alone on the radio or television,”137 the Court erred in striking down Guideline as it
is applied to Dwyer. Guideline 3 is not unduly burdensome as applied to advertising on a
website. Other situations where Guideline 3 applies were not before the court to consider, and
therefore the Court should not have let them affect their holding.138
Part IV: The Effect
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court emphasized the great importance and unwavering
power of the First Amendment, stating “[i]f the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it
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means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression
because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public.”139 This authoritative statement
represents a pillar of American freedom, and this Note does not undermine it. Therefore, the
reader must recognize that where this Note contemplates the effects of the Third Circuit’s
holding, it does not do so to present any of them as justifications for overturning the Third
Circuit. These are separate and distinct issues. Ultimately, the ruling in Dwyer should be
overturned because the Third Circuit misused the lenient Zauderer standard to invalidate
Guideline 3.
The Third Circuit’s ruling will likely have several prominent consequences. Though there
may be other results from the holding, this Note will only focus on the two most likely outcomes.
First, the Third Circuit’s holding will make it harder, moving forward, to meaningfully restrict
attorney’s speech to benefit the public. Additionally, and arguably more importantly, the Court’s
holding will negatively impact public trust in the legal community at large, and in the
impartiality of the judiciary.
First, the Third Circuit’s holding took a large step away from the accepted practice of
assuring attorney’s free conduct and speech do not impede their vital role as counselors,
advocates, and professionals in the legal field. 140 It was not, and is not, uncommon for rules
governing attorney’s behavior and responsibilities to infringe upon attorney’s rights in several
ways. In fact, all fifty states have laws governing attorney conduct as it applies to advertising. 141
The “Canons of Professional Ethics” generally restricted an attorney’s right to publicize
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regarding pending litigation; and even when it was permitted, attorneys were forbidden from
speaking anonymously about it.142 Even some of the most modern rules substantially limit an
attorney’s ability to make any “extrajudicial statement” that has the potential to prejudice an
adjudicative proceeding.143 Furthermore, attorneys are still restricted in the manners in which
they can advertise. For example, New Jersey attorneys are currently unable to utilize “drawings,
animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics” in commercials.144 Also, though the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld a “Best Lawyer” rating system, there are twelve “regulatory components”
that any advertisement using such a label needs to satisfy.145
Some restrictions have been overridden or rewritten over time but the same ideal, that it
is appropriate and necessary to restrict attorney’s speech and conduct, has been the guiding
motivation throughout. This stems from the understanding that attorneys undertake an important
professional imperative that deals with the most crucial “system” in the nation, the legal system.
Without appropriate restraint, however, the legal profession will cease to be directed primarily at
aiding the client and will become a solely commercial enterprise where competing attorneys
spend more time on marketing than advocating on behalf of their client. Without restraint,
attorneys could forsake the good of their clients, and the public at large, for financial gain.
Without restraint, attorneys could use their superior knowledge of the legal system to mislead
clients into pursuing options, or spending money, that might not be wise.
For example, if New Jersey attorneys were not restricted from using music or
dramatizations in their television advertisements, their commercials could be so distracting, with
cartoons and loud music, that the potential clients would have no idea about what services the
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attorney actually offers. Additionally, a commercial in which an attorney is dressed as superman
might mislead a viewer into believing that the attorney is claiming to be the best attorney in the
relevant area. While this specific restriction might make an attorney’s commercials dull in
comparison to other commercials, it is a helpful tool in preventing viewers from being confused
and mislead. Lastly, an attorney allowed to utilize the term “Best Lawyer”, without also being
required to provide information regarding the twelve regulatory components that fully explain
the “Best Lawyer” selection process, could certainly cause a potential client to believe that some
third party agency truly labeled that attorney as the best one in New Jersey. These examples
demonstrate the necessity for restriction in attorney advertising for the benefit of the public at
large.
This does not imply that all restrictions are constitutional, however. For example, the
“Canons of Professional Ethics” banned the use of business cards without personal relations
because it offended “the traditions and lower[ed] the tone of our profession,” but Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz.146 invalidated that indiscriminate ban on attorney speech.147 What it does imply is
that a substantial government interest exists in restricting the speech and conduct of attorneys.
There is a sense, then, that when men and women take up the noble task of establishing a career
in the law, they must accept that certain freedoms must be forfeited when balancing against other
societal interests.
By ruling in favor of an attorney who believed his rights were impeded because he could
not quote specific judges in the exact way he desired, the Third Circuit has created dangerous
precedent where the valuable restraints on attorney conduct may begin to slowly erode and give
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way to unrestrained attorneys. These restraints hold a special importance not as applied to all
professions in which the public trusts, but specifically in the legal profession. The Supreme
Court in Bates stated that the legal profession is held to a higher standard of conduct than most
other professions, and that “misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in
other advertising may found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.” 148 Although the Court
placed some onus on the legal profession to attempt to remove any misunderstandings the public
may have about attorney advertising, it eventually ruled that self-evidently misleading
advertising can be restricted without appealing to the public or attempting to clarify the
advertisement. 149 And even though the Supreme Court, again in Bates, wrote, “[w]e are not
persuaded that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be misleading,” the
Third Circuit’s ruling in Dwyer may lead to unbridled advertising. 150
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, through Cappell, stated that it had a compelling
interest in enforcing Guideline 3 because it aimed to “preserv[e] public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary.” 151 Ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Guideline 3, the
District Court recognized this purpose of the guideline when it stated that advertisements that
“could be easily misconstrued as improper judicial endorsements” would threaten “the integrity
of the judicial system.”152 This confidence extends to the entire legal community, however, and
the Third Circuit’s ruling threatens to undermine that confidence. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has recognized the importance of regulating attorney conduct, stating in In Re Hearing on
Immunity for Ethics Complainants, “[w]e ask the public to trust and believe that justice is being
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done . . . We ask them to trust a system in which the initial proceedings and the initial appellate
review are dominated by lawyers.”153 There, the New Jersey Supreme Court demonstrated an
understanding that overseeing and restricting attorney conduct is a vital aspect of public trust in
the legal system.154 Because of the Third Circuit’s holding in Dwyer, attorneys are now capable
of using quotes that can easily be understood by reasonable, but uninformed, persons to be
blanket endorsements and the public might begin to believe that attorneys can compete for the
favor of judges.155 This is troubling because of the mandate that judges act in ways that “public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” 156 A judge is unable to show
favoritism to any particular attorney. But, this holding threatens the same public confidence that
judicial restrictions aim to protect.
This presents a significant problem because of the potential for damaging results when a
community loses trust in the propriety of the legal system. Most Americas are familiar with
examples demonstrating that the public seeks justice in ways that are less than appropriate when
it does not feel as though it can trust the legal profession.157 This is the reason New Jersey sought
to restrict attorney’s free speech; public confidence in attorney conduct is of supreme value. If
individuals begin to lose their trust in the ability of attorneys to faithfully and selflessly represent
them, as opposed to using them as their next paycheck, then all the attorney free speech in the
world will not undo the damage done.
Though free speech is a beautiful right and one of the most fundamental rights upon
which our nation is built, it must be balanced, in the commercial context, against other important
national interests. Because Dwyer broadens the limits of attorney conduct and advertising even
153
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farther for future cases, and may cause the public to lose trust in the impartiality of the legal
system as a whole, the Third Circuit’s ruling threatens to upset this balance.
Part V: Conclusion
The Supreme Court of New Jersey correctly indicated that “attorney advertising without
any restrictions whatsoever might seriously damage important public interests, but that excessive
restriction might harm other public interests equally important.”158 This balance ought to be at
the forefront of any free speech analysis regarding attorney conduct and advertising. This Note
has not endorsed excessive restriction on attorney advertising; rather, that, in ruling that
Guideline 3 was unconstitutional as applied to Andrew Dwyer, the Third Circuit was mistaken
on both the law and public policy interests that fuel codes of professional conduct across the fifty
states and, more importantly, in New Jersey. Because Dwyer’s advertising was deemed to be
inherently misleading by the source of the quote, Judge Wertheimer, it did not deserve to receive
any constitutional protection. In that case, Guideline 3 is constitutional and appropriate.159
Alternatively, even if Dwyer’s advertising was not inherently misleading, Guideline 3
satisfies the two prongs for disclosure requirements established in Zauderer. 160 Guideline 3
meets the first prong that the requirement be reasonably related to the State’s interests, which in
this case are to prevent deception of potential clients and also preserve public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. Providing the full contexts of judicial quotes at least reasonably
serves those interests, even if, admittedly, the goals are potentially better served by other
measures. This is satisfactory because Circuit Courts have understood that Zauderer does not
require a narrow tailoring of the disclosure requirement to the goal, only, again, that they be
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“reasonably” related.161 Guideline 3 satisfies the second prong because it does not unduly burden
Dwyer. It argued that, in attempting to use the Internet as his medium of choice to advertise,
Dwyer is still capable of posting his desired text along with the required disclosures Guideline 3
mandates and, because of this, he is not effectively banned from advertising.
Furthermore, this Note examined the public policy concerns with the Third Circuit’s
holding and suggested that this ruling will have an impact on attorney advertising and then,
consequently, a significant impact on the public’s view of the legal system in general. This ruling
could open the door for future unrest as people lose faith that attorneys are obligated to act in the
best interests of their clients, instead behaving more like a commercial entity whose main
objective is the bottom dollar. Additionally, the Third Circuit’s ruling has a much more direct
effect on the public view of judicial biases, as Judge Wertheimer’s quotes may reappear on
Dwyer’s website at any time and a reasonable person could easily conclude that the quote
constitutes a blanket endorsement of Dwyer, giving the appearance of favoritism and
impropriety.162
Ultimately, one can only guess at the future implications of this decision, particularly if
other circuit courts rule in like manner. This Note does not endeavor to postulate all potential
roads this ruling might lead us down, nor could it do so. One thing can be known for certain—
though Andrew Dwyer won before the Third Circuit in the summer of 2014, his was not a
victory for the legal profession or for the public at large.
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